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Abstract 
This study aimed to re-evaluate the lay assumption that empathic concern is entirely 
guided by prosocial motivations. To this end, the Empathic Concern Motivations Scale was 
created to measure the magnitude of one’s prosocial and/or antisocial motivations to manifest 
empathic concern for another person. Participants reported both prosocial and antisocial 
motivations for empathic concern, and these motivation types were uncorrelated, independent 
constructs. The degree of prosociality of participants’ motivations varied by target types, such 
that more prosocial motivations were reported for ingroup targets while more antisocial 
motivations were reported for outgroup targets. Responses to the scale were subsequently 
compared to established measures of empathy (the Interpersonal Reactivity Index) and antisocial 
personality (the Psychopathic Personality Inventory – Revised). These comparisons indicated 
that the relationship between motivations to empathize and the IRI depended on valence of 
motivation, but not target type, such that prosocial motivations were positively correlated with 
IRI’s measurement of empathy. As for psychopathic personality traits, motivation reports 
depended on both the valence of motivation (i.e. prosocial or antisocial) and the target of one’s 
empathic concern, such that PPI-R scores were positively correlated with antisocial motivations 
and uncorrelated with prosocial motivations. Furthermore, those higher in psychopathic traits did 
not show the heightened prosocial motivations towards ingroup targets, as was demonstrated 
across the sample more generally. These findings support a broader conceptualization of 
empathic concern that considers the potential for more than just prosocial antecedents, while 
reiterating the importance of the empathizer-target relationship.  
BEYOND PROSOCIAL MOTIVATIONS TO EMPATHIZE   3 
 
Acknowledgements 
 I would like to begin with a gracious thank you to my incredible support system. Thank 
you first and foremost to my supervisor, Dr. Matthew Shane, for his unwavering professional 
and personal support over the last few years. Dr. Shane managed the perfect balance of 
challenging me to achieve my own successes, and patiently guiding me in the right direction 
when I needed it. I truly appreciate his vision of my potential and his ability to bring out my best 
work. I would also like to acknowledge Dr. Kimberley Clow as the second reader of this thesis 
and valued member of my committee. I am grateful for her constructive comments and 
thoughtful contributions to this project. Another sincere thank you goes to my colleagues and 
friends, William Denomme, Lindsay Groat, and Isabelle Simard, for always being eager to help 
me along this journey. There was not a time that I couldn’t turn to them for theoretical 
discussion, help with statistical analyses, or for kind words of encouragement. Finally, a 
profound thank you goes to my close friends and family, who proudly stood by my side as I 
worked towards this milestone. Your continuous support and encouragement made the 







BEYOND PROSOCIAL MOTIVATIONS TO EMPATHIZE   4 
 
Table of contents 
Introduction....................................................................................................................................7 
 Defining empathy.................................................................................................................9 
  Cognitive Component..............................................................................................9 
  Affective Component.............................................................................................10 
 Motivating Empathy..........................................................................................................11 
  Motivation and Empathic Concern........................................................................12 
  Questioning Whether Empathic Concern is Always Prosocially Motivated.........13 
Empathic Concern and Antisociality.................................................................................14 
Current Study..............................................................................................................................16 
 Phase 1...............................................................................................................................16 
  Purpose...................................................................................................................16 
  Background............................................................................................................17 
  Predictions..............................................................................................................20 
 Phase 2...............................................................................................................................20 
  Purpose...................................................................................................................20 
  Background............................................................................................................21 




  Empathic Concern Motivations Scale....................................................................25 
   Instructions.................................................................................................25 
BEYOND PROSOCIAL MOTIVATIONS TO EMPATHIZE   5 
 
Strategy for Determining Targets..............................................................26 
   Outcome Variables.....................................................................................28 
    Mean Motivations..........................................................................28 
    Total Motivations...........................................................................29 
    Ratio Scores...................................................................................29 
  IRI..........................................................................................................................31 
  PPI-R......................................................................................................................32 
  Demographics........................................................................................................33 
 Procedure...........................................................................................................................34 
Results 
 Phase 1...............................................................................................................................34 
  Scale Validation: Verifying Targets and Target Types.........................................34 
   Confirming Target Type Categorizations Using Closeness.......................34 
   Confirmatory Factor Analysis....................................................................35 
   Reliability Analysis....................................................................................37 
  Scale Validation: Verifying Motivation Types......................................................37 
   Confirmatory Factor Analysis....................................................................37 
   Reliability Analysis....................................................................................38 
   Comparing Factors.....................................................................................38 
  Measuring Motivation............................................................................................39 
   Mean Scores ..............................................................................................40 
Total Scores ..............................................................................................41 
Ratio Scores ..............................................................................................41 
BEYOND PROSOCIAL MOTIVATIONS TO EMPATHIZE   6 
 
 Phase 2...............................................................................................................................43 
  IRI..........................................................................................................................43 
  PPI-R......................................................................................................................45 
Discussion......................................................................................................................................47 
  Phase 1...................................................................................................................48 
Phase 2...................................................................................................................50 
General Discussion................................................................................................52 
















BEYOND PROSOCIAL MOTIVATIONS TO EMPATHIZE   7 
 
BEYOND PROSOCIAL MOTIVATIONS TO EMPATHIZE 
Introduction 
Empathy is important for understanding the motivations, intentions, and viewpoints of 
others. Unfortunately, empathy has been heterogeneously defined for as long as scientists have 
been studying it. While diverse conceptualizations of the construct mirror to some extent its 
complexity, they also impair the ability to fully understand the construct itself, and to reconcile 
the often inconsistent and difficult to interpret research findings. Before appropriate conclusions 
can be drawn from the inconsistent findings, a clearer grasp of the construct itself needs to be 
achieved. Similar sentiments lamenting the heterogenous conceptualizations of empathy have 
been expressed by numerous empathy researchers (Decety & Moriguchi, 2007; Gerdes et al., 
2010; Mar, 2011; Wispé, 1986; Zaki, 2014). In line with these concerns, the present thesis seeks 
to reach some additional clarity regarding the specific motivations underlying the engendering of 
empathy.  
In particular, the work presented within aims to re-evaluate the lay assumption that 
empathic concern – the affective component of empathy – is entirely guided by prosocial 
motivations (Batson, 1991; Davis, 1983; Eisenberg et al., 2015). Rather, the possibility that 
people may be prosocially and/or antisocially motivated to empathize will be explored in several 
ways. To this end, a few examples of different potential motivations to empathize may be useful: 
First, one might be concerned with the thoughts or feelings of another person because he or she 
feels compassion or concern for the other person’s wellbeing. This is the lay understanding of 
what empathic concern is, and it implies a prosocial motivation to empathize. Alternatively, one 
might be concerned with the thoughts or feelings of another person because understanding that 
information may allow for more successful manipulation of the other person. While less aligned 
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with lay understandings of empathy, this more self-serving motive may also emulate a true 
motivation for understanding others thoughts/feelings. It is likely the case that people will be 
prosocially motivated to empathize in some situations and towards certain people, while 
antisocially motivated to empathize in some situations and towards certain other people (Bubandt 
& Willerslav, 2015; Galinsky et al., 2008). Berger and colleagues (2015) show support for this as 
well, with findings that aggression and prosociality can co-exist within the same individual.  
While the underlying motivations may differ in important ways, they may still both result in an 
increased desire/attempts to understand the thoughts and/or feelings of another person. Thus, a 
full conceptualization of empathy may require incorporation of both prosocial and antisocial 
motivations (Bubandt & Willerslav, 2015; Zaki, 2014). This study aims to empirically test this 
theoretical possibility.   
To explore potential prosocial and antisocial motivations underlying empathy, I created 
and validated a new scale intended to quantify the extent to which people report either 
prosocially or antisocially motivated to empathize. In a second phase of the study I sought to 
evaluate convergent and divergent validity of the scale, by evaluating the extent to which data 
from the scale related to other conceptually related emotional/personality measures (ie. empathic 
concern, perspective taking, psychopathic traits). First, an in-depth background into the construct 
of empathy will be provided, followed by a detailed consideration of the motivations that may 
underlie its manifestation.  Methods and results from both phases of the study will then be 
reported, followed by a consideration of the impact of these results on the conceptualization and 
measurement of empathy.  
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Defining Empathy 
Empathy has been conceptualized and compartmentalized in a multitude of ways, and so 
a precise, agreed upon definition of the construct has remained elusive. Broadly, and most 
commonly, empathy is conceptualized as a multidimensional social construct that improves our 
ability to understand and anticipate the thoughts, emotions, and behaviours of others. However, 
variation exists with regard to whether empathy is automatic or controlled (De Greck et al., 
2012; Hodges & Wegner, 1997; Singer et al., 2004), whether it is a state or a trait (Banissy et al., 
2012; Coleman, 2009; Van der Graaff et al., 2016), and whether emotions elicited by 
empathizing can be incongruent or must be congruent (Lishner, Batson, & Huss, 2011; Preston, 
2007; Vachon & Lynam, 2016). Recently, Cuff and colleagues’ (2014) conducted a review of 
current conceptualizations in the field, and they reported that a cognitive-affective distinction 
between empathy’s components is the most discussed distinction, and frequently serves as a 
starting point for identifying what empathy is (Cuff et al., 2014). Each of this components will 
therefore be described in turn. 
Cognitive Component. The cognitive component of empathy has been labeled in various 
ways within the extant literature, including perspective taking (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; 
Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, et al., 2008) cognitive empathy (Cox et al., 2007; Smith, 2006), and 
theory of mind (Hughes & Leekam, 2004; Singer & Tusche, 2014); in this paper it will be 
identified as perspective taking. It encompasses the processes involved in cognitively 
understanding another person’s thoughts or emotions. Some have previously suggested that it 
employs the cognitive skill of ‘mentalizing’, which involves recognizing and creating a mental 
representation of another person’s mental state (Frith & Frith, 2006). Some have characterized 
this as a skill (Galinsky & Schweitzer, 2016; Kidder, 2017) that is used as a part of the empathic 
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process. Consistent with this notion, Galinsky & Schweitzer (2016) describe perspective taking 
as “a critical skill for navigating our social world,” (p. 33), perhaps particularly useful for 
leaders, who need to be able to motivate others. Empirical research finds that people differ in 
their ability to accurately infer the emotions of others (i.e. perspective take; Bernstein & Davis, 
1982; Ickes et al., 1990; Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008), and that some people are able to 
improve perspective taking skills through practice (Barone et al., 2005; Block-Lerner et al., 
2007; Kidder, 2017).  It may thus exist as an ability that can be improved, rather than a static 
trait.   
While rarely referenced in the empirical literature,  a small body of research does suggest 
that perspective-taking can be either prosocially or antisocially motivated. On one hand, it can be 
prosocial in instances when it is intended to reduce conflict (Galinsky, 2002) or minimize 
intergroup prejudice (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005). On the other hand, perspective taking has 
been described as an advantageous skill in contexts where it “pays to get inside the head of your 
opponent” (Galinsky et al., 2008). Galinsky and colleagues (2008) found that perspective taking 
skills are used strategically in negotiation and competition contexts. The measurement of 
prosociality or antisociality of motivations underlying empathy in the current study is therefore 
more novel to the affective component. For this reason, the affective component will be the 
greater focus of the current work. 
Affective Component. The affective component of empathy is frequently labeled as 
empathic concern, and is described as an “other-oriented feeling of sympathy or concern for 
unfortunate others” (Davis, 1983). Some authors have conflated empathic concern with 
compassion, defining empathic concern as an emotional response of compassion (Niezink et al., 
2012). Ohers emphasize isomorphism between the empathizer and the target by defining it as the 
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tendency to be in tune with others’ feelings and perspectives (Chopik, O’Brien, & Konrath, 
2017; Decety & Lamm, 2006). A common theme among the variety of empathic concern 
conceptualizations is an interest in another person. 
 There has been some debate regarding empathic concern’s automatic versus motivated 
nature. Empathic concern has notably been described as an automatic process (Rameson et al., 
2012; Singer & Lamm, 2009; Sonnby-Borgsrom, 2002), in part because of one of the sub-
processes – emotional mimicry – that frequently gets grouped with empathic concern 
operationally (Decety & Meyer, 2008; Sato & Yoshikawa, 2007). This is the process by which 
one’s physiological response to someone else’s emotion, indicated by neural activity, is to mimic 
that response within the self (see Iacoboni, 2009 for review). More recently, though, scholars are 
beginning to recognize motivation’s role in the process of empathic concern, highlighting that it 
may be more than just an automatic process. For example, Lockwood and colleagues (2017) 
explored the relationship between empathic concern and motivation through the use of an apathy 
scale (which measured lack of motivation). They found via factor analysis that empathic concern 
and emotional motivation were underpinned by the same latent factor, and that social and 
emotional motivation are associated with greater empathic concern (Lockwood et al., 2017). As 
proposed by Zaki (2014), “empathy is often a motivated phenomenon in which observers are 
driven either to experience empathy or to avoid it.”  
Motivating Empathy. 
Zaki & Cikara (2015) posited that we need to know the specific nature and precursors of 
empathy to understand why people may or may not empathize (Zaki & Cikara, 2015). What 
tunes people towards or away from empathic concern (i.e. what motivates empathic concern) is 
important for a complete understanding of the construct. Consistent with this notion, empathic 
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concern appears to reflect not just the context one is in, but also the individuals’ motives within 
that context (such as affect, affiliation, and social desirability; Weisz & Zaki, 2018; Zaki, 2014). 
Other authors have explored the different features that might deter one from empathic concern, 
such as the cost of cognitive effort, personal suffering, and material costs should that concern 
lead to, for example, monetary donation to someone in need (Cameron, 2016; Cameron, Inzlicht, 
& Cunningham, 2017). Investigating the different characteristics of the empathizer, target, and 
situation are some of the ways that researchers have attempted to make inferences about the 
motivational nature of empathy (Fraser et al., 2012; Gleichgerrcht & Decety, 2013; Hein & 
Singer, 2008). 
Motivation and Empathic Concern. Researchers have at times emphasized the 
interconnectedness – sometimes even synonymy – of motivation and emotion (see review by 
Elliot, Eder, & Harmon-Jones, 2013). Furthermore, research has identified various situational 
and interpersonal variables that have been shown to impact one’s tendency to demonstrate 
empathic concern (De Vignemont & Singer, 2007). For example, empathic concern is greater 
among those who are in a more positive mood (Nelson, 2009), and towards those with whom one 
is more familiar (Preston & De Waal, 2002). Interpersonal evaluations can also influence the 
neural indicators of empathic concern, such as was found in a study by Singer and colleagues 
(2006). Perceiving the target as someone who is unfair reduces activation in empathic concern 
regions of the brain (Singer et al., 2006; see also Lamm et al., 2007). This suggests that 
motivational factors may have the capacity to either increase or decrease one’s motivation to  
manifest empathic concern. 
Though this line of work is sparse, recent electrophysiological work has focused on 
evaluating the potential motivational underpinnings of empathic concern. Tullett, Harmon-Jones, 
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and Inzlicht (2012) proposed a potential link between motivation and empathic concern (but not 
perspective taking), based on their findings regarding EEG asymmetry. In their study, greater 
frontal EEG asymmetry in areas associated with approach/withdrawal motivations, and 
positive/negative emotions, were associated with an increased likelihood of experiencing 
empathic concern when viewing emotional images. Activity within regions underlying 
motivational and emotional processes appeared to overlap in situations where subjects were 
empathizing with others’ emotions. Interestingly, there was not a similar association between 
frontal asymmetry and the authors’ measure of prosociality and helping intentions (Tullet et al., 
2012). This suggests that while empathic concern is related to motivation, it is not necessarily 
associated with prosocial motivations. 
Questioning Whether Empathic Concern is Always Prosocially Motivated. Many equate 
empathic concern with the prosocial constructs sympathy and compassion, but these terms are 
actually quite separate constructs. Empathic concern has been described as attuning to the 
feelings of others, while sympathy has been described as sorrow for another’s unfortunate 
situation and/or a compassionate,  loving response (Clarke, 2010; Sinclair et al., 2016; Soto-
Rubio & Sinclair, 2018). In this way sympathy may be thought of as one possible motivation for 
empathy (Smith, 1969). In this vein, it has been suggested that having compassion for the target 
of one’s empathy may add to empathy a warm and positive regard for the other (Chismar, 1988). 
Part of why empathic concern, specifically, has been assumed to be prosocial may be because of 
its frequent conflation with these other prosocial constructs. Emphasising its distinctiveness from 
these other constructs highlights that empathic concern need not be solely prosocial. 
Empathic concern being perceived as a positive and desirable social construct (see 
Hoffman, 2001) is also due in part to its demonstrated association with prosocial behaviours. 
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While behaviours may not always be a reliable indication of motivation (Bagozzi, 1992), 
behaviours may nonetheless provide some insight into the underlying motivations to show 
concern. To this end, it is of note that empathic concern has been associated with greater self-
reported charitable giving (Davis, 1983; Verhaert & Van den Poel, 2011, Bekkers, 2006), greater 
self-reported concern for the welfare of others (Batson, 1998), greater frequency in volunteering 
(Marjanovic, Struthers, & Greenglass. 2012), and overall greater self-reported prosocial 
tendencies (Carlo, Hausmann, Christiansen, & Randall, 2003). However, it’s important to note 
that some studies suggest that empathic concern is not always a predictor of prosocial behaviours 
(Carlo, Allen, & Buhman, 1999; Einolf, 2008; see review by Underwood & Moore, 1982), or, if 
it is, only weakly so (see review by Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Einolf (2008), in considering a 
wide range of helping behaviours, found that empathic concern was predictive of some forms of 
helping but not others. For instance, it was predicting of helping when the target was 
immediately present with the empathizer, but not when that target was remote (Einolf, 2008). 
Without a consistent, predictive relationship between empathy and prosocial behaviour, the field 
should not assume this association to establish empathy’s theoretical basis as solely 
prosocial.These findings make it apparent that empathic concern is a contributor to prosocial 
outcomes, but how it actually motivates people to help is not yet understood (Penner et al., 
2005).  
Empathic Concern and Antisociality 
As some have proposed, the literature’s tendency to concentrate on empathy as a 
prosocial emotion has resulted in limited consideration of the possibility that empathy is can be 
manifested for less wholesome purposes (Bubandt & Willerslav, 2015; Prinz, 2011; Wispé; 
1986). Indeed, reference has at times been made to the notion of “tactical empathy,” whereby an 
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individual might be motivated by seduction, deception, manipulation, or violent intent to 
empathize with another person (Bubandt & Willerslav, 2015). Examples of such tactical empathy 
may include the reading of one’s opponent during business negotiations (Galinsky et al., 2008) 
or the manipulation of one’s victim to complete a grift or con (Gasser & Keller, 2009; Mullins-
Nelson et al., 2006). 
Further support for the notion that empathic concern may sometimes be antisocially 
motivated comes from the mixed findings regarding the presumed negative association between 
empathic concern and antisociality. Low empathic concern often predicts increased aggression 
(Batanova & Loukas, 2011), moral disengagement (Bussey et al., 2015), bullying (Endresen & 
Olweus, 2001; Kaukiainen et al., 1999), and affective/interpersonal abnormalities in 
psychopathic personalities (Seara-Cordoso et al., 2012).  Moreover, having higher empathic 
concern for your ingroup members can motivate one to aggress towards outgroup members (see 
review by Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011). Instances like this, where a prosocial motivation 
towards some others (e.g. to protect one’s own group) may lead to an antisocial motivation 
towards others (e.g. to aggress towards the outgroup), demonstrate the importance of one’s 
motivation for empathic concern in determining its relationship with behaviour. 
Nonetheless, while many suggest that people who commit criminal offences are 
characterized by empathic concern deficits (Bush, Mullis, & Mullis, 2000; Elliot et al., 2009; 
Lishner et al., 2012), the connection between empathy and offending (Joliffe and Farrington, 
2004)is not as clear-cut as researchers often portray it to be (Kirsch & Becker, 2007). For 
example, one meta-analysis found that the relationship between low empathy and offending 
might be strong for some offenders but not others, and that the relationship even disappears when 
controlling for characteristics like intelligence and socioeconomic status (Jolliffe & Farrington, 
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2003). Another meta-analysis revealed that the relationship between empathy and aggression is 
surprisingly weak (r = -.11), and that this is consistently the case across various types of 
aggression. In an individual study, Goldstein (2001) found that nonviolent male offenders as a 
whole actually scored higher on empathic concern than a control group comprised of community 
members. These results support the notion that those who are aggressive or antisocial are not 
necessarily lacking a capacity for empathic concern, but perhaps are better characterized as 
having motivational differences from those who are not antisocial (Arbuckle & Shane, 2017; 
Gillespie et al., 2014; Meffert et al., 2013). It thus seems pertinent to consider characterizing the 
empathic concern that is presented by antisocial individuals, rather than dismissing the 
possibility that they have any empathic concern. 
Current Study 
Across two phases, a new scale was validated and its relationship with theoretically 
relevant measures was explored. Each phase will be described in turn. 
Phase 1  
Purpose. The purpose of Phase 1 was to create a scale that measures participants’ 
motivations to concern themselves with the thoughts or feelings of others. Most importantly, the 
purpose of this scale was to include potential antisocial motivations for being concerned with the 
thoughts or feelings of others, in addition to stereotypical prosocial motivations. Furthermore, 
since there may be various reasons as to why someone might be concerned with the thoughts or 
feelings of others, participants were asked to indicate the extent of this concern across several 
specific motivations. Half were prosocial in nature, such as “I would care to know about what 
this person is thinking or feeling because it affects me greatly to see them in pain,” while the 
other half were antisocial in nature, such as “I would care to know about what this person is 
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thinking or feeling because I may be able to manipulate them to get my way.” Asking 
participants to report the extent to which they would be motivated for these various prosocial and 
antisocial reasons, across a wide range of target individuals, allowed us to explore the prevalence 
of prosocial motivations and antisocial motivations. It was important to incorporate a wide range 
of target individuals in the questionnaire because of the extensive literature that has established 
the importance of the empathizer-target relationship for the experience of empathic concern. A 
summary of the relevant literature regarding the measurement of empathy and the importance of 
the empathizer-target relationship are discussed, followed by Phase 1 research questions and 
predictions based on these literatures.  
Background: Measuring Empathy. Probably the most common method for measuring 
empathy is administering self-report questionnaires, of which there are several. Interestingly, 
these questionnaires often differ regarding their concepualization of empathy, which has reduced 
cohesiveness of the empirical literature. For example, the once-popular Hogan Empathy Scale 
(Hogan, 1969) is generally rooted within a cognitive view of empathy, and thus includes items 
that query the individual’s ability to perspective-while the Measure of Emotional Empathy scale 
(Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) more closely evaluates one’s tendency to vicariously experience 
the emotions of others (see Chlopan, 1985). More recently, multifaceted measures of empathy 
have been created that attempt to distinguish between the various affective and cognitive 
subcomponents of empathy and provide a more comprehensive evaluation of the construct. The 
first such measure, the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis,1980) has proven itself a highly 
valid and reliable measure (Gilet et al., 2013), and remains widely used today. Strengths of the 
scale include attempts to identify the important contributions to empathy that are made by a 
person’s ability to understand others’ perspective and the visceral, emotional reaction to others’ 
BEYOND PROSOCIAL MOTIVATIONS TO EMPATHIZE   18 
 
emotions (Davis, 1983), and subsequently achieved a measure that quantified both. Subsequent 
measures of empathy have continued to distinguish between the cognitive and affective 
components of empathy. For example, the Empathy Quotient (EQ) has proven both valid and 
reliable (Lawrence et al., 2004; Allison et al., 2011).  
New measures of empathy are developing alongside the development and further 
specification of the empathy construct itself. The trend as new measures of empathy develop is 
that they are becoming increasingly specific with how they break down the cognitive and 
affective components of empathy, which is a great avenue for more precise measurements of 
empathy as a whole. That said, current measurements of empathy are lacking in their ability to 
identify what motivates the construct. Further, if research starts to show that empathic concern 
can be prosocially and antisocially motivated, it would suggest that current conceptualizations 
(and therefore measurements) of empathic concern are incomplete. Prior to further specifying 
and quantifying empathic concern, we need to ensure that we have a complete comprehension of 
the construct. The present study sought to therefore investigate motivations for empathic 
concern, while also considering a broader range of motivations (both prosocial and antisocial).  
Background: The Empathizer-Target Relationship. The relationship between an 
empathizer and his or her target is a particular contextual feature that influences empathic 
concern (See review by De Vignemont & Singer, 2006). Affiliation with others is an important 
social motivator that increases the cooperative nature of groups (Keltner, Oatley, & Jenkins, 
2014), and influences empathy and empathic behaviour towards both in and out group-members. 
Stürmer et al. (2006), for example, found that empathy has a stronger influence on helping for 
those who are in our own cultural group, and that the empathy-helping relationship varies as a 
function of perceived similarities with the other person. Even at an individual level, Hoffman 
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(2001) found that people empathized to a greater degree with family, friends, and those close to 
them, compared to strangers (see also Mathur, Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010). Specifically, 
empathic concern has been linked to willingness to help kin but not strangers, and research 
suggests that the factors that motivate prosocial behaviour in close relationships might be 
different from those that motivate prosocial behaviour towards strangers (Maner & Gailliot, 
2007). Given the evidence for this social influence, researchers should consider potential social 
motivations, such as closeness to, or affiliation with, targets when determining what motivates 
empathic concern.  
People tend to show less empathy for those in “other” groups (ie. other than the group 
one affiliates with; Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005), and this may be because the level attachment 
to or connection with a person is important for arousing empathic concern (Stürmer et al., 2005). 
Consequently, empathic concern leads to increased helping for ingroup members than for 
outgroups members, and interacts with various interpersonal factors (Stürmer et al., 2005). It 
would be imprudent to neglect consideration of these interpersonal factors when investigating 
what motivates empathic concern. To this end, the interpersonal factors of closeness and 
affiliation were carefully evaluated within the present thesis.  
To this end, participants’ perceived closeness to each target was also measured. Social 
closeness is a broad term that can be characterized by the extent of interdependence (Kelley et 
al., 1983), or perceived self-other overlap (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Aron, Mashek, & 
Aron, 2004) or similarity (Miller et al., 1998). This perception can come from various 
dimensions, such as age, gender, or personality traits (see Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 2009). 
Oppositely, social distance is a subjective perception based on interpersonal features such as a 
generally perceived differences between the self and the other, a distinction between one’s own 
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group identity and that of the other, and a lack of familiarity (Magee & Smith, 2013). While 
people report greater closeness to ingroup members than outgroup members (Dorrough et al., 
2015), it is useful to consider individuals’ perceived social closeness in addition to presumed 
indices of closeness (such as biological or physical closeness). For instance, emotional closeness 
has been found to mediate the increase in prosocial behaviours towards targets who were 
identified as ingroup members because of genetic relatedness (Korchmaros & Kenny, 2001).  
Furthermore, research has indicated the mediatory effects that a perceived self-other overlap 
(Batson et al., 1997; Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2008; de Guzman et al., 2015) and emotional 
closeness (Beeney et al., 2011; Müller-Pinzler et al., 2015) can have on empathic processes. 
Thus, a measure of perceived closeness with targets may provide important insights beyond the 
pre-designated Target Types.  
Predictions. I hypothesized that there would be significant differences in how 
participants were motivated (prosocially vs antisocially) for the different Target Types (ingroup, 
neutral group, and outgroup). Specifically, participants were expected to report the most 
prosocial motivations for ingroup targets and the most antisocial motivations for outgroup 
targets. If supported, I expected that Total Motivation scores would be highest for ingroup (and 
lowest for outgroup) members as a result of the heightened prosocial motivation for this group. 
Finally, I hypothesized that the ratio score would indicate the greatest difference between 
prosocial and antisocial motivations for ingroup targets, such that this group would show the 
greatest preference for prosocial motivations over antisocial motivations.  
Phase 2  
Purpose. Following scale validation, Phase 2 aimed to evaluate convergent validity of 
the new scale with a popular measure of empathy: the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). 
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Situating the quantification of empathic motivations among a commonly used measure of 
empathy identifies how the new scale is similar to yet divergent from more traditional empathy 
measures. Another main purpose of Phase 2 was to evaluate the extent to which clinically 
relevant personalities (namely, those with high levels of psychopathic traits) might show 
evidence of a motivation to empathize. Characterizing the prosociality or antisociality of 
empathic motivations for those with varying levels of psychopathic traits would have 
implications for how this more comprehensive conceptualization of empathic concern relates to, 
and might help to explain, empathy and antisociality. Current measures may obscure the 
empathic concern that antisocial populations exhibit because of the narrower conceptualization 
of the construct as solely prosocial, and so the scale developed in Phase 1 was used to address 
this limitation. The relevant literature for empathic concern and psychopathy is discussed next, 
followed by Phase 2 research questions and hypotheses.  
Background: Empathic Concern and Psychopathy. Psychopaths comprise a clinically 
antisocial population, and so features of this population can be used to explore whether empathic 
concern can be antisocially motivated. The psychopath is partly defined by his low empathic 
concern (Hare, 1991) and this is supported by clinical (Domes et al., 2013) and subclinical 
(Dadds et al., 2009; Seara-Cardoso et al., 2012; Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012) studies. For example, 
Mullins-Nelson and colleagues (2012) reported a moderate correlation (r = -.406) between 
empathic concern and psychopathic traits among undergraduate university students. These 
results are appealing, as they support a longstanding understanding of the psychopath, but there 
are some notable inconsistencies in the literature. For example, a series of two studies by Lishner 
and colleagues (2015) found little evidence of an association between empathic concern and 
psychopathic traits, except for with the trait of callous affect. These authors suggest that it may 
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just be the trait of callous affect that is responsible for the supposed link between psychopathy 
and an affective empathy impairment, rather than the psychopathic personality as a whole.  
Alternatively, scientists are beginning to propose that it may not be a lack of ability for 
the psychopath to demonstrate empathic concern towards others, but rather a lack of motivation 
to do so. For example, Arbuckle and Shane (2016) and Meffert and colleagues (2013) found that, 
although antisocial individuals generally show a reduction in the neural network involved in 
empathic concern when viewing others in pain, they had the ability to consciously increase the 
activation of these networks when asked to increase their concern for the person they are 
viewing. Distinguishing between an ability and a propensity to empathize suggests that the 
deficits that psychopathic individuals exemplify could be at least partly motivational. The next 
step for researchers may then be to characterize what would motivate them to either approach or 
avoid empathy.  
Research to date has yet to explore specifically what drives a psychopath to engage in 
empathic concern, as this population has long been thought incapable of such experience. 
Behavioural studies, which may be used as an indirect approximation of underlying motivations, 
have shown that psychopaths do engage in prosocial, empathic behaviors, but only when they are 
in public and there is a chance that they may receive credit for their actions (White, 2013). This 
may indicate that psychopaths are motivated to be empathically concerned for someone else 
when there is some sort of external gain. This motivation is important to understand, particularly 
if there is a chance that clinicians could encourage and motivate psychopathic individuals to 
engage in this concern for prosocial purposes. Some literature suggests that this would reduce the 
amount of antisocial behaviour that they engage in and potentially even increase their levels of 
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prosocial behaviour (Blair, 2005), but what motivates psychopaths to engage in empathic 
concern has been elusive to researchers to date.  
With little work in the realm of empathic concern and antisociality, conceptually similar 
constructs can be consulted as a guide for how we might approach this largely uncharted 
territory. Research has found, for example, that males with higher psychopathic traits, in addition 
to those who are high in emotional intelligence (which includes empathy), are more emotionally 
manipulative (Grieve & Mahar, 2010). In this instance, emotional intelligence is used 
antisocially, with the goal to manipulate the emotions of others. Grieve (2011) also found that 
social cue understanding is particularly important for emotional manipulation, and with cognitive 
social understanding (i.e. perspective taking) often intact in psychopathic populations (see Blair, 
2006 for review), it thus follows that psychopaths may be quite able to employ these social skills 
when interacting with others. Most often, however, the psychopath will choose to employ such 
social skills maliciously. Such malicious intentions could apply in the context of empathic 
concern as well, not just emotional intelligence more generally, and in fact the results of Phase 1 
do provide preliminary evidence of this possibility. 
The prosociality or antisociality of one’s motivations may also be inferred from the 
individual’s perceived personal benefit of his or her actions. For example, White (2014) found 
that the affective characteristics of the psychopath are associated with increased public prosocial 
behaviour, and only decreased prosocial behaviour when it was anonymous. It thus appears that 
the psychopath may not always lack empathic concern, and may show this concern to employ 
intact social skills when it benefits himself (i.e. to improve public image rather than for altruistic 
motives). Therefore, the idea that empathic could be prosocially or antisocially motivated may be 
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the missing link to explain the inconsistent findings regarding the empathic deficits of antisocial 
populations. 
Predictions. I anticipated that scores on the established measures of empathy and 
psychopathic traits would predict motivations to empathize. Regarding the IRI, I predicted that 
prosocial motivations would be predicted by empathic concern because of the prosocial basis on 
which this subscale was created, but I did not have a hypothesis about the relationship with 
perspective taking. It was unclear how antisocial motivations would—or would not—relate to 
the IRI, as motivations for empathic concern are not measured by the IRI. It was also unclear 
whether the IRI subscales would predict the motivations differently for the different target types. 
Next, I predicted that psychopathic traits might be positively related to Total Motivation. 
This would suggest an increased overall motivation for those with heightened psychopathic 
traits. The reason for this prediction is based on the hypothesis that those with psychopathic traits 
would report much more antisocial motivations. As a result of the inherent antisociality 
associated with psychopathic traits, I predicted fewer prosocial motivations to be reported by 
those who scored higher on this measure. While the precise pattern of motivation for the 
different target types among those with higher psychopathic traits was uncertain, I predicted that 
the pattern of higher antisocial motivations would remain regardless of Target Type.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 144 UOIT students in Introduction to Psychology or Abnormal 
Psychology who received partial course credit for their participation. The first ten participants 
were used for pilot data, after which we expanded the questionnaire to include a longer list of 
targets. These ten participants were excluded from analyses due to the differences in their 
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questions compared to subsequent participants. Furthermore, one participant was removed for 
responding abnormally on key variables (i.e. was an outlier on motivations to empathize, 
closeness, and empathic concern). Participants were also removed if they neglected to complete 
enough of the Empathic Concern Motivations Scale. If more than 1/3 of the targets in ingroup, 
neutral group, or outgroup were skipped by a participant, then that participant was removed from 
analyses. Consequently, nine participants were removed who failed to respond to more than one 
third of at least one target type (ingroup, neutral, or outgroup). Additionally, there were 3 
participants removed because of missing personality measures. This left 126 participants for 
validation analyses. There were 34 males (27.6%) and 89 females (72.4%). The ages of 
participants ranged from 17 years old to 33 years old, with a mean age of 19.48 years (SD = 
2.27).  
Measures 
Empathic Concern Motivation Scale (ECMS). I developed a self-report questionnaire 
to assess the extent to which people experience prosocial and/or antisocial motivations to 
empathize for a wide variety of targets (family and friends, opponents and strangers).  
ECMS Instructions. 
To complete the scale, participants received the following instruction:  
“Below you are going to see a list of titles for people you know. For each title, 
think of one person. We will ask you to indicate how well you know that person, 
and how you would care to know what that person is thinking or feeling at any 
given moment. If an option does not apply to you (for example, you do not have a 
brother), then please leave that section blank. If an option applies to you more 
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than once (for example, you have more than one brother), you will have to choose 
just one person to complete the section for.” 
 Following these instructions, for each and every target, participants indicated the extent 
to which they would care to know what the person was thinking or feeling (on a scale from 1 = 
not at all to 7 = very much) for the following reasons 
 … because I may be able to manipulate them to get my way 
 … because it’s wise to get information that you can use against people later on 
 … because of what I can get for them 
 … because I have tender concerned feelings for them 
 … because I want to protect them 
 … because it affects me greatly to see them in pain” 
After all motivations were rated for a given target, participants were asked to indicate 
“how close are you to this person?” as a measure of the strength of the relationship between the 
target and the participant. This was done to account for the possibility that the a priori Target 
Type creation strategy (i.e. to establish ingroup, neutral group, and outgroup targets) might not 
fit perfectly for each participant. For full questionnaire, see Appendix 1.  
ECMS Construction: Strategy for Determining Targets. In creating the list of targets for 
this measure, graduate and undergraduate students brainstormed a broad range of potential and 
hypothetical individuals with whom participants might have an opportunity to empathize with. 
Within this list of targets, Target Types were established by labelling targets as “ingroup, 
“neutral group,” and “outgroup” based on existing social psychological research. We considered 
these categories because group status (i.e., ingroup vs. outgroup) of the target of one’s empathy 
has been shown to have a significant influence on the extent and accuracy of one’s empathy (see 
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Eisenberg, Eggum, & Di Giunta, 2010 and Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2017 for reviews). Group 
status may be based on various characteristics of another person (see Lickel & Hamilton, 2001), 
such as similarity to (Shkurko, 2014), or familiarity with, the other person (Krill & Platek, 2009), 
common goals or a common enemy (Rothbart & Park, cited by Hamilton, 2007, p. 1080), or 
even estimations about future contact with the other person (see Shkurko, 2014).The broad terms 
“ingroup” and “outgroup” typically encompass a broad range of identities or affiliations that a 
person may have. The assessment of group status is therefore understandably complex and more 
continual than is implied by the dichotomy of ingroup and outgroup labels (Shkurko, 2014). To 
include targets who are expect to be categorized clearly as ingroup and outgroup might then limit 
responses to a) prosocial motivations towards ingroup targets and b) antisocial motivations 
towards outgroup targets. Therefore, the middle category (“neutral”) was established to better 
encompass the continuousness of group differences. The addition of this Target Type was 
intended to elicit a wider range of repsonses, as some might feel prosocially motivated towards 
these targets while others might feel antisocially motivated. 
The strategy for target brainstorming was to create a list of targets that encompassed the 
wide range of potential characteristics that one might use to classify the target as an ingroup or 
an outgroup member. This was intended to create a comprehensive list of potential or 
hypothetical empathy targets. Following the creation of the target list, the ingroup consisted 
largely of family members and friends (such as mother, best friend, and teammate), the neutral 
group consisted largely of people one might encounter but may not feel any attachment to (such 
as a teacher, a restaurant server, and someone crying on the street), and the outgroup consisted 
largely of competitors or disliked others (such as someone you’re jealous of, somone who took 
advantage of you, or your opponent in a strategy game). While participants may respond 
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similarly to each other on ingroup and outgroup targets, the neutral group was added as a target 
type that is likely to result in more varied responses, which in turn might point out greater 
individual differences.  
ECMS Outcome Variables. The format of this measure allowed for the calculation of 
multiple scores for analyses within and between participants. Each of these scores (mean 
prosocial motivation, mean antisocial motivation, total motivation, and motivation ratio) were 
calculated across all targets for an overall description of participants’ motivations, as well as for 
each of the Target Types to explore potential intergroup differences in motivation. Should 
intergroup differences in motivation for empathic concern be found, as has been found with other 
measures of empathic concern, then the outcome scores should be considered separately for each 
Target Type. The various possible outcome scores that the scale can produce are beneficial 
because different scores can be utilized to answer different research questions. Each 
measurement and relevant research questions are discussed in turn. 
Mean Motivations. Mean scores were calculated for the prosocial motivations and 
antisocial motivations across all targets for each participant. This score provided a measure of 
the average degree of motivation for each of the motivation types separately. With this measure, 
the following research questions could be addressed: 
1. Are people sometimes antisocially motivated to empathize?  
2. Does Target Type influence the extent to which people are prosocially or antisocially 
motivated? 
I hypothesized that people would report both motivation types, at least to some extent, 
though one may be reported more frequently than the other. I predicted that people would report 
greater prosocial motivations than antisocial motivations on average, but this measure would not 
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specifically indicate whether one Motivation Type is more frequently reported than the other at 
an individual level (i.e. it is possible that if mean scores for the two motivation types are equal, 
then half of participants reported one type while the other half reported the other type). Finally, I 
also hypothesized that prosocial and antisocial motivations would differ by Target Type, such 
that the highest prosocial motivations would be reported for ingroup targets and the highest 
antisocial motivations would be reported for outgroup targets.  
Total Motivation. As a measure of participants’ total motivation, a sum score was 
calculated by adding together the mean prosocial motivations and the mean antisocial 
motivations. This score indicated the magnitude of motivation, both prosocial and antisocial, for 
each participant, and can answer the following research question: 
1. Are there significant differences in Total Motivation (i.e. overall motivation 
regardless of valence) between the different Target Types? 
Because of the affiliation and likely contact with ingroup targets, I expected that this 
Target Type would produce the highest Total Motivation. However, it was also possible that 
higher Total Motivation scores could be reported for the outgroup targets. If participants were to 
report particularly high antisocial motivations for outgroup targets, then this would increase 
Total Motivation for this group as well. I anticipated that the neutral group would not generate as 
much motivation overall.  
The Ratio of Prosocial to Antisocial Motivation. Two methods were possible to achieve 
a score that indicated the relationship between prosocial and antisocial motivations within each 
participant. First, a difference score was calculated by subtracting the antisocial motivation 
mean from the prosocial motivation mean for each participant. This was done for all Target 
Types together and each target type individually. Second, a ratio score was calculated by 
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dividing prosocial motivation means by antisocial motivation means overall and for each target 
type individually.  
In order to determine which computation method to use as a measure of the relationship 
between prosocial and antisocial motivations within each participant, each method was assessed 
for its relationship with relevant variables, namely empathic concern, perspective taking, and 
psychopathic traits. This indicated which method was most relevant to these variables of interest, 
and thus which score to use in subsequent analyses. The difference score and the ratio score 
consistently correlated with the variables of interest across all Target Types, and also correlated 
highly with each other (r = .915, p < .001). There were instances where the difference score was 
more highly correlated with the variables of interest than the ratio score and vice versa. The 
correlation between outgroup difference score and perspective taking was only marginally 
significant (r = .157, p = .074), while the ratio score was significantly correlated with all 
variables of interest across all Target Types. Relationships of difference scores and ratio scores 
to empathic concern, perspective taking, and psychopathic traits therefore did not provide an 
indication that one score was more relevant. The decision to choose the ratio score over the 
difference score was made due to the possibility that some participants’ difference scores could 
be a negative value if they fell below zero (e.g. if someone had a higher mean antisocial score 
and it was subtracted from a lower prosocial motivation score, the outcome variable would be a 
negative value). The ratio score was therefore chosen as the best indicator of the extent to which 
one Motivation Type exceeded another within each participant. 
As this ratio was created by dividing prosocial motivations by antisocial motivations, we 
can infer whether individual participants are generally more prosocial or generally more 
antisocial. A ratio score of 1 is indicative of an equal degree of prosocial and antisocial 
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motivations. If the score is greater than 1, then prosocial motivations are greater than antisocial 
motivations, and if the score is less than 1, then the antisocial motivations are greater than the 
prosocial motivations. As scores get further from 1, this would mean that the preference for one 
motivation time over the other is increasingly strong. This measure was used to answer the 
following research questions: 
1. Are people generally more prosocial than antisocial? 
2. Does a preference for prosociality over antisociality differ depending on Target 
Type? 
I hypothesized that people would report greater prosocial motivations than antisocial 
motivations at an individual level, but that this preference for prosociality over antisociality 
would decrease from ingroup to neutral group to outgroup targets. That is, I predicted that the 
preference for prosociality would be strongest for ingroup targets and weakest for outgroup 
targets.   
IRI. This scale was used to measure empathy’s multiple components. It is comprised of 4 
inter-related subscales that measure empathic concern, perspective taking, personal distress, and 
fantasy (Davis, 1983). The IRI acknowledges the fact the empathy is a multidimensional 
construct and it involves both cognitive and affective components by measuring each component 
individually. Initial validation was provided by Davis (1983), and confirmed by many others 
(e.g., Carey, Fox & Spraggins, 1988; Cliffordson, 2001, Pulos et al. 2004; Hawk et al., 2013). 
For the purposes of this study, the empathic concern and perspective taking subscales were 
analyzed. Participants rated items from 1 (Does not describe me) to 5 (Describes me very well). 
The empathic concern subscale includes items such as “I often have tender concerned feelings 
for people less fortunate than me,” while the perspective taking subscale includes items such as 
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“I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective.” Each of these subscales is created from a sum of 7 separate items.  
The IRI was measured in the current study to answer the following research questions: 
1. Do empathic concern or perspective taking (as measured by an established empathy 
measure) predict mean prosocial or mean antisocial motivations to empathize? 
2. Are empathic concern or perspective taking predictive of an overall motivation to 
empathize at all, regardless of motivation valence? 
3. Do empathic concern or perspective taking predict a preference for prosocial 
motivations over antisocial motivations?  
a. Does the ability for these subscales to predict prosocial motivations over 
antisocial motivations differ based on Target Type? 
I hypothesized that prosocial motivations might be predicted by the empathic concern 
subscale of the IRI, but not antisocial motivations. This prediction is based on the IRI’s prosocial 
conceptualization of empathy, rather than the prediction that the IRI measures motivations to 
empathize. It was unclear how Total Motivation or a preference for one motivation type over 
another (i.e. Ratio scores) would be predicted by empathic concern or perspective taking.  
PPI-R. This scale was used to measure psychopathic traits. The PPI-R has demonstrated 
high reliability and validity in both general community and male/female forensic samples (e.g., 
Hughes & Stout, 2013). Although the average level of psychopathic traits is low in non-forensic 
samples for some of the items, studies show that there is sufficient response variability to allow 
for interpretation (Falkenback et al., 2007, Levenson et al., 1995). It is comprised of 154 
questions that can be divided into 3 factors: self-centered/impulsivity (e.g. “If I want to, I can get 
people to do what I want without them ever knowing”), fearlessness/dominance (e.g. “When I’m 
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in a frightening situation, I can “turn off” my fear almost at will”), and coldheartedness (e.g. “I 
look out for myself before I look out for anyone else”). Participants respond to the question “how 
false or true is each statement in describing you?” on a scale of “false,” “mostly false,” mostly 
true,” and “true.”  
The PPI-R was measured in the current study to answer the following research questions: 
1. Are psychopathic traits predictive of an overall motivation to empathize, regardless of 
motivation valence? 
2. Do psychopathic traits predict mean prosocial or mean antisocial motivations to 
empathize? 
3. Do psychopathic traits predict a preference for prosocial motivations over antisocial 
motivations?  
a. Does the ability for psychopathic traits to predict prosocial motivations over 
antisocial motivations differ based on Target Type? 
I hypothesized that psychopathic traits will either be unrelated to Total Motivations, or 
positively related to Total Motivations. This was because I predicted a particularly high report of 
antisocial motivations by those who scored high on psychopathic traits. While these individuals 
were predicted to score low on prosocial motivations, the heightened antisocial motivations 
could outweigh the lack of prosocial motivations to ultimately produce an increase in Total 
Motivation to empathize. While a preference for antisocial motivations over prosocial 
motivations (i.e. a low ratio score) was expected for those with higher psychopathic traits, it was 
unclear how this might differ based on Target Type. 
Demographics Questionnaire. Participants were asked for general demographics 
information, including age and gender. These questions were used to describe the sample.  
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Procedure 
The students were seated at computers in a quiet lab, where they were unable to view the 
responses of others. Once seated, they read and signed the consent form, and then completed 
multiple self-report questionnaires, described next, to assess empathy and personality 
characteristics. At the end of the study, participants were taken for debriefing and thanked for 
their participation.  
Results: Phase 1 
Scale validation: Verifying Targets and Target Types. As this was a new scale, it was 
important to consider whether all targets on the questionnaire were valid. Participant responses 
on the ECMS were explored to determine if there were any targets that lacked variance or were 
too highly correlated with other targets to provide unique value to the scale. Factor analyses 
categorized targets into Target Types to confirm the presence a priori groups (ingroup, neutral 
group, and outgroup). Calculations of reliability and internal consistency also aimed to identify if 
there were targets that should be removed for future iterations of the questionnaire.     
Investigating potential violations of normality. Skewness values outside of the range of 
-2 to 2 are considered significant enough to violate assumptions of normality (Garson, 2012). 
Overall mean motivations for all individual targets were tested for skewness, and no targets 
violated the assumption of normality. Therefore, no targets were removed or transformed due to 
normality violations. 
Confirming Target Type Categorizations using Closeness. In creating the list of 
targets for this measure, graduate and undergraduate students brainstormed a broad range of 
potential and hypothetical individuals, based on closeness, with whom participants might have an 
opportunity to empathize with. Within this list of targets, Target Types were established by 
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labelling targets as “ingroup, “neutral group,” and “outgroup.” Target type categorization was 
largely based on previous research regarding the characteristics of ingroup and outgroup, but 
participants’ own perceptions of affiliation with targets in these groups was obtained by 
measuring self-reported closeness to each target. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA 
determined that there was a significant difference in the closeness ratings between target types (F 
= 1283.73. p < .001, η2 = .954),1 and Bonferroni-corrected pairwaise comparison indicated that 
the ingroup closeness ratings (m = 5.15, sd = .91) were significantly higher than both the neutral 
(m = 1.77, sd = .61) and outgroup (m = 1.68, sd = .79) ratings (ps < .001), but that the neutral 
and outgroup ratings did not differ (p = .37). Participants self-reported being closer to ingroup 
targets, as expected, compared to neutral and outgroup targets, but did not report feeling 
significantly closer to neutral targets than outgroup targets. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis. A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to 
confirm that targets categorized in a similar way statistically as they did theoretically. Given the 
large list of targets, and the modest sample size, I acknowledge that this factor analysis is 
somewhat underpowered. The results of this factor analysis should therefore be interpreted with 
caution, and are intended only as a post-hoc exploration of the validity of the a-priori target type 
categorizations. 
Initially, the factor analysis extracted 9 components based on an eigenvalue greater than 
one. Upon a visual inspection of the scree plot and the location of the elbow, it appeared that, 
beyond the first three components, the groups that were extracted barely qualified as their own 
factors. Beyond three factors, there was no clear visual distinction between components. As 
                                                          
1 Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant, W = .71, p < .001, meaning that the assumption of 
sphericity was violated. The results of the multivariate tests were therefore consulted. 
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such, the factor analysis was rerun and restricted to producing 3 factors. This made it more 
difficult for the similar components to be grouped separately, and is likely to better represent the 
data in this case. For individual factor loadings, see Appendix 2. 
Inspection of the factor loadings resulted in a factor structure highly similar to what we 
had in mind during the target list creation phase of the study. There were 7 targets (Grumpy 
Customer, Teacher, Bus Driver, Coworker that you get along with, Teammate, Someone you are 
jealous of, and someone you dislike) that did not load clearly onto just one factor. However, 
when a target loaded onto two factors, there was always one component that made the most 
theoretical sense for that target. Overall, the factor structure did confirm that participants were 
perceiving the targets as intended (i.e. as a range of ingroup, neutral group, and outgroup 
members). A list of targets and their assigned Target Type (as either ingroup, neutral group, or 
outgroup) is presented in Figure 1.    
































A child throwing a tantrum
Someone on the street crying
Outgroup
Someone you're jealous of
Someone you dislike
Someone you hate
Took advantage of you
Rude to best friend
Opponent in a game
Bully
Hitler
Someone who hurt your 
mother
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Reliability Analyses. Reliability analyses indicated that the targets in each Target Type 
were a good fit in that category. The ingroup targets produced a Cronbach’s α of .889 for 
prosocial motivations and a Cronbach’s α of .957 for antisocial motivations. The neutral group 
targets produced a Cronbach’s α of .893 for prosocial motivations and a Cronbach’s α of .913 for 
antisocial motivations. Finally, the outgroup targets produced a Cronbach’s α of .730 for 
prosocial motivations, while the antisocial motivations revealed a Cronbach’s α of .901.  
Scale Validation: Verifying Motivation Types 
Factor Analysis. To establish independence of the two a priori motivation types, a factor 
analysis was conducted that entered the means for each of the 6 motivations: ‘manipulate,’ 
‘information,’ ‘gain,’ ‘concern,’ ‘protect,’ and ‘affects me’ (see Table 3 for Descriptive 
Statistics). The factor analysis applied a varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization. The 
factored items mapped onto the theorized prosocial and antisocial constructs. Specifically, 
‘manipulate,’ ‘information,’ and ‘gain’ all loaded onto the same latent structure, which we 
labelled ‘antisocial motivations.’ The items ‘concern,’ ‘protect,’ and ‘affects me’ all loaded onto 
the same latent structure, which we labelled ‘prosocial motivations.’ Factor loadings are 
presented in Table 1.  
Table 1.  
Motivation Items: Factor Analysis 
 Components 
Motivations 1 2 
Concern .963 .097 
Protect .970 .092 
Affects Me .965 .001 
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Manipulate .079 .970 
Information -.023 .968 
Gain .133 .935 
 
Reliability Analysis. The items in each of the resulting components were scaled into 
mean motivation scores for each Motivation Type using the means of each individual motivation. 
Internal consistency was subsequently tested through reliability analysis, which indicated high 
internal consistency for both Motivation Types. Specifically, the Cronbach’s alpha was .951 for 
antisocial motivations and .955 for prosocial motivations. There were no significant 
improvements to Cronbach’s alpha when any item was removed from the scale, so all items 
remained in the scale. The items within the two underlying components showed high intra-
component correlations (rs > .833, ps < .001), and low inter-component correlations (rs < .128). 
Descriptive statistics for motivation items and scaled Motivation Types are presented in Table 2.  
Comparing Factors. The correlation between the Motivation Types as scaled variables 
indicated no significant relationship (r = .130, p = .148). While a large positive correlation would 
have indicated collinearity and a large negative correlation would have indicated reciprocity 
between these two constructs, the low correlation indicated, rather, that the two constructs are 
functionally distinct. High prosocial motivations did not indicate lower or higher antisocial 
motivations. 
The mean prosocial motivation score (m = 3.13, SD = .090) was higher than the mean 
antisocial motivation score (m = 2.51, SD = 1.20), but the larger standard deviation for antisocial 
motivations is indicative of greater variation in scores for this Motivation Type. This suggests 
that people are generally more prosocially motivated than antisocially motivated to concern 
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themselves with others’ thoughts and feelings, but that there are greater individual differences 
between participants with regards to antisocial motivations.    
Table 2. 
Motivation Items: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean SD 
Prosocial Motivations 3.13 0.90 
 Concern 3.08 0.84 
 Protect 3.04 0.94 
 Affects me 3.28 1.00 
Antisocial Motivations 2.51 1.20 
 Manipulate 2.56 1.28 
 Information 2.44 1.20 
 Gain 2.55 1.26 
 
Measuring Motivation 
The main method of measuring the two types of motivation individually was through 
calculating a mean score for prosocial and antisocial motivations for each participant, as 
presented above. However, a Total Motivation Score and Motivation Ratio Score were also 
calculated to obtain quantification of one’s overall motivation to empathize (both prosocial and 
antisocial motivations) and one’s prosocial motivations in relation to his or her antisocial 
motivations, respectively. Means and standard deviations for each measurement method are 
presented in table 3. ANOVAs were thus conducted for each of the measurement types, to 
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specifically identify whether differences seen between Target Types are significant and, if so, the 
strength of that difference. 
Table 3         
Motivation Descriptive Statistics 
Measurement Method All Targets Ingroup Neutral Outgroup 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Mean Motivation 2.82 0.79 3.89 0.78 2.47 0.88 2.42 0.95 
 Prosocial  3.13 0.90 5.56 0.91 2.66 1.05 1.64 0.83 
 Antisocial  2.51 1.20 2.17 1.12 2.19 1.09 3.15 1.63 
Total Motivation  5.65 1.59 7.79 1.57 4.92 1.75 4.78 1.74 
Motivation Ratio  1.54 0.85 3.24 1.66 1.48 0.87 0.73 0.64 
 
Mean Scores. Both prosocial and antisocial motivations to empathize were reported. As 
predicted, participants reported more prosocial motivations than antisocial motivations on 
average. I hypothesized a significant interaction between Target Type and Motivation Type, such 
that participants were more prosocially motivated towards ingroup targets, but more antisocially 
motivated towards outgroup targets. A 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to 
determine if there were significant mean differences in prosocial and antisocial motivations for 
the different Target Types (see table 4 for descriptive statistics)2. There was a significant main 
effect for both Target Type (Wilks’ Lambda = .117, F = 463.62, multivariate partial η2 = .883, p 
< .001) and Motivation Type (Wilks’ Lambda = .754, F = 40.50, multivariate partial η2 = .246, p 
                                                          
2 Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant, W = .68, p < .001, meaning that the assumption of 
sphericity was violated. The results of the multivariate tests were therefore consulted. 
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< .001). The mean difference of .783 between prosocial motivations and antisocial motivations 
was statistically significant (p < .001). The relationship between target type and motivation type 
was best explained, however, by the significant interaction between these variables (Wilks’ 
Lambda = .113, F = 484.709, multivariate partial η2 = .887, p < .001). The significant differences 
between Target Types is dependent on motivation type such that prosocial motivations are 
significantly higher than antisocial motivations for ingroup targets (t = 26.31, p < .001) and 
neutral targets (t = 3.63, p < .001), but that prosocial motivations are significantly lower than 
antisocial motivations for outgroup targets (t = -8.83, p <.001). 
Total Scores. I predicted that Total Motivation would be highest for ingroup targets, as 
the targets within this group are ones with which participants will likely have more future 
interactions. Therefore, regardless of Motivation Type, participants might be more concerned 
overall with the thoughts and feelings of this group. Descriptive statistics indicate that the 
highest total motivation score was for ingroup targets (M = 7.79, SD = 1.57), followed by 
neutral group targets (M = 4.92, SD = 1.75), and outgroup targets (M = 4.78, SD = 1.74). A 1 by 
3 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if there these mean differences were 
significant. The results indicated that the differences in total motivations between ingroup and 
neutral group, and ingroup and outgroup were significant (ps < .001), but that the difference 
between total motivations for neutral group and outgroup was not significant (p = 1.00). Total 
motivation is much higher for ingroup targets compared to neutral group or outgroup targets, but 
there is no distinction between neutral group total motivation and outgroup total motivation.  
Ratio Scores. The ratio score was the most descriptive measure of participants’ 
motivations because it took into account the nature of participants’ motivations (i.e the 
prosociality or antiscoaility of the motivations). The additive value of this measure was that it 
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allowed for determination of if prosocial motivations in relation to antisocial motivations. With 
a mean ratio score of 1.54, participants tended to be more prosocially motivated than 
antisocially motivated. I hypothesized that the greatest difference between prosocial and 
antisocial motivations would be for ingroup targets because prosocial motivations were expected 
to be particularly high for this group. Descriptive statistics (see Table 4) suggested that the 
preference for prosocial motivations over antisocial motivations was strongest for ingroup 
targets. The mean ratio score for neutral targets indicated a prosocial preference for this group as 
well, but not for outgroup targets. The mean ratio score below 1 for outgroup targets indicated a 
preference for antisocial motivations over prosocial motivations for this group. A 1 by 3 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if the differences in ratio scores for the 
different Target Types were significant. Results showed that there was a significant main effect 
of target type (Wilks’ Lambda = .252, F = 182.68, multivariate partial η2 = .748, p < .001)3. 
Following up on the target type variable with a Bonferroni correction indicated that all pairwise 
comparisons were significant. This means that while there was an overall significant difference 
in motivation between each pair of Target Types, ingroup and neutral group (Mean difference = 
1.768, p < .001), ingroup and outgroup (Mean difference = 2.528, p < .001), and neutral group 
and outgroup (Mean difference = .760, p < .001). The preference for prosocial motivations 
compared to antisocial motivations was significantly greater for ingroup targets than neutral 
group targets, and significantly greater for neutral group targets than outgroup targets. 
 
 
                                                          
3 Mauchly’s test of sphericity was significant, W = .287, p < .001, meaning that the assumption of 
sphericity was violated. The results of the multivariate tests were therefore consulted. 
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Results: Phase 2 
The purpose of phase 2 was to investigate the relationship between the ECMS and 
theoretically related existing Measures. The IRI and PPI-R were thus assessed to determine their 
relationship with motivations for empathic concern. Descriptive statistics for these measures and 
their subscales / factors are presented in table 4. 
Table 4   
Descriptive Statistics   
Measure / Subscale Mean SD 
IRI   
 Empathic Concern 20.52 4.48 
 Perspective Taking  18.47 5.02 
PPI-R   







 Coldheartedness 1.85 0.43 
 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)  
I predicted that the empathic concern subscale of the IRI would relate only to the 
prosocial motivations to empathize, because of the prosocial conceptual foundation from which 
this scale was created. While the perspective taking subscale may also relate to the motivations 
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to empathize, I did not predict it to relate specifically to one Motivation Type over the other. The 
correlation between these two IRI subscales of interest was moderate and positive (r = .370, p < 
.001). Both empathic concern and perspective taking did, however, correlate similarly to the 
different motivation types, such that there was a significant positive correlation with only the 
prosocial motivations for both subscales (see table 5). A multiple hierarchical regression was 
conducted where empathic concern and perspective taking were entered into the model together 
at block 1, and their interaction at block 2, to predict prosocial motivations, to identify the 
contribution of the subscales individually versus their interaction. The adjusted R2 of the model 
summary indicated that 12.6% of the variation in prosocial motivations was explained by 
empathic concern and perspective taking (F = 9.78, p < .001). Prosocial motivations increased 
significantly as empathic concern increased (β = .056, t = 3.01, p = .003), and increased 
marginally significantly as perspective taking increased (β = .032, t = 1.96, p = .053). Adding the 
interaction between empathic concern and perspective taking did not make a significant 
contribution to the model (t = -1.224, p = .223), which indicated that the subscales uniquely 
contribute to prosocial motivations. 
With the subscales significantly correlated with only one motivation type, the correlations 
found between the IRI subscales and the motivation ratio score were expected. Empathic concern 
(r = .269, p < .003) and perspective taking (r = .239, p = .008) were both significantly correlated 
with the ratio of prosocial to antisocial motivations, such that higher scores were associated with 
greater prosociality versus antisociality. A multiple hierarchical regression was conducted where 
empathic concern and perspective taking were entered into the model at block 1, and their 
interaction at block 2, to predict the ratio of prosocial to antisocial motivations. This elucidated 
the unique contribution of each of these variables to the prediction of Prosocial to Antisocial 
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Motivation Ratio. The adjusted R2 of the model summary indicated that 8.1% of the variation in 
prosocial to antisocial motivation ratio was being explained by empathic concern and perspective 
taking (F = 6.376, p = .002). The ratio of prosocial to antisocial motivations increased 
significantly as empathic concern increased (β = .041, t = 2.275, p = .025), and increased 
marginally significantly as perspective taking increased (β = .028, t = 1.765, p = .080). The part 
correlations of Empathic Concern (.197) and Perspective Taking (.153) were similar, but it 
appeared that Empathic Concern had a slightly higher unique contribution to the model. Adding 
the interaction between empathic concern and perspective taking did not make a significant 
contribution to the model (t = .016 p = .987). That said, this result must be interpreted with 
caution, as the IRI subscales did not correlate with antisocial motivations to empathize, and 
antisocial motivations to empathize were included in the calculation of motivation ratio.  
A generalized mixed effects regression was conducted to determine whether empathic 
concern and perspective taking predicted the prosocial to antisocial ratio differently for the 
different Target Types. Results indicated that with all three variables in the model, target type (F 
= 151.470, p < .001) was a significant predictor of motivation ratio, but empathic concern (F = 
1.379, p = .241) and perspective taking (F = .143, p = .705) were not. Empathic concern and 
perspective taking did not predict the motivation ratio differently for the different target types. 
Again, this result must be interpreted with caution, as the IRI subscales did not correlate with 
antisocial motivations to empathize, and antisocial motivations to empathize were included in the 
calculation of motivation ratio.   
Psychopathic Personality Inventory – Revised (PPI-R). 
A central research question for this phase of the thesis asks whether or not those with 
heightened psychopathic traits might be equally or more concerned with the thoughts and 
BEYOND PROSOCIAL MOTIVATIONS TO EMPATHIZE   46 
 
feelings of others. It was hypothesized that equal or greater total motivation scores would be the 
result of heightened antisocial motivations but reduced prosocial motivations. Results showed 
that psychopathic traits indeed correlated positively with total motivation to empathize (r = .263, 
p < .005). While it seems contrary to the literature (i.e. that higher psychopathic traits would be 
associated with an increased motivation to empathize), a consideration of the motivation types 
individually elucidated the nature of this relationship. As hypothesized, psychopathic traits 
correlated positively with antisocial motivations to empathize (r = .428, p < .001). Alternatively, 
psychopathic traits were not significantly correlated with prosocial motivations to empathize (r = 
-.103, p = .257). The finding that psychopathic traits are uncorrelated with prosocial motivations 
suggests that it is perhaps the heightened antisocial motivations – and not a lack of prosocial 
motivations – that leads to the overall antisocial characterization of those with psychopathic 
traits. 
Table 5 
Pearson Correlations Among IRI Subscales, PPI-R Subscales, and Mean Motivations 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Prosocial Motivation ---     
2. Antisocial Motivation .130 ---    
3. Empathic  Concern .336** -.106 ---   
4. Perspective Taking .274** -.068 .355** ---  
5. PPI-R Total Score -.103 .428** -.412** -.152 --- 
Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level; ** indicates significance at the .005 level 
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With psychopathic traits as a whole only significantly correlated with the antisocial 
motivation type, the correlation between psychopathic traits and the motivation ratio score was 
expected (r = -.424, p < .001). Higher scores for psychopathic traits predicted less prosociality of 
participants’ motivations. A linear mixed effects model was conducted to determine whether 
psychopathic traits predicted the prosocial to antisocial ratio differently for the different Target 
Types. Ratio score was significantly predicted by target type (F = 26.745, p < .001), PPI scores 
(F = 73.739, p < .001), and an interaction between target type and PPI scores (12.144, p < .001). 
Higher PPI scores predicted lower ratio scores (t = -2.452, p = .016), indicating that those with 
more psychopathic traits tended to report less prosocial motivations compared to antisocial 
motivations overall. Importantly, though, this effect significantly differed by target type. Higher 
PPI scores predicted lower ratio scores for ingroup targets than for outgroup targets (t = -4.747, p 
< .001), and lower ratio scores for neutral targets than for outgroup targets (t = -2.595, p < .010). 
This means that individuals higher in psychopathic traits reported a lower proportion of prosocial 
motivations (i.e. less of a prosocial bias) as Target Type moved from outgroup targets to neutral 
group targets to ingroup targets. Those with higher psychopathic traits do not appear to 
demonstrate the prosociality preference for ingroup targets that was generally seen across the 
sample.  
Discussion  
Considering that researchers are in constant flux regarding the establishment of a precise 
definition of empathy (Songhorian, 2015; Coplan, 2011; Kunyk & Olsen, 2001) and have 
excluded the possibility that empathic concern might be antisocially motivated in some 
circumstances, the exploration of empathic concern and antisociality has been limited. The 
present thesis ventured to revisit the field’s more original interpretations of the construct, 
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whereby “one need not truly care about another person in order to empathize” (Chismar, 1988). 
This approach holds the potential to clarify why some of these inconsistencies are presented in 
the literature simply by recognizing that motivations for empathic concern beyond just 
prosociality may be present. 
Phase 1 
Two important confirmations were demonstrated in Phase 1 to indicate that the Empathic 
Concern Motivation Scale was measuring motivations in the way it was intended. First, I verified 
via confirmatory factor analysis that the target list could be sectioned into ingroup, neutral group, 
and outgroup targets. Second, I confirmed that there were two latent structures among the 
motivations to empathize: prosocial motivations and antisocial motivations. Altogether, this scale 
validly measured participants’ motivations across two valences (prosocial and antisocial) across 
three target types (ingroup, neutral group, and outgroup).   
The findings from Phase 1 lend support for the theory that empathic concern may be 
prosocially or antisocially motivated. Participants reported a concern for the thoughts and 
feelings of others because of a concern for the well-being of the target, because of a want to 
protect the target, and because it affects the participant to see the target in pain. Such motivations 
are in line with the notion that empathic concern is prosocially motivated. What this newly 
developed scale quantified for the first time, was that participants can often be antisocially 
motivated as well. They reported a concern for the thoughts and emotions of others because they 
could use that knowledge to manipulate the target and to gather information that could be used 
against the target in the future, and because that knowledge could be used for personal gain. 
People tended to be more prosocially concerned with the thoughts and feelings of others 
compared to antisocially motivated, but the finding that empathic concern is frequently 
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antisocially motivated supports that assumption that empathy is solely prosocial may be 
unfounded. 
 It should be noted, however, that the wording of the prosocial and antisocial motivations 
did differ somewhat.  For instance, one might argue that the wording of the prosocial motivations 
were more affective in nature, pertaining to warm/caring feelings, while the antisocial 
motivations were more cognitive in nature, pertaining to manipulative/self-serving intentions. If 
true, one could argue that the two motivation types were actually more of a measurement of the 
affective and cognitive components of empathy, respectively, rather than of prosocial/antisocial 
motivations for empathic concern. While further testing may be required to evaluate this 
hypothesis, there are at least two ways that the data in the current study suggest that this is not 
the case. First, there was no correlation between the prosocial and antisocial motivation types, 
despite a strong correlation between empathic concern and perspective taking measures of the 
IRI (r = .355, p < .001). Thus the prosocial and antisocial motivations do not appear related to 
each other in the same way that empathic concern and perspective taking are. Second, including 
perspective taking in the model where antisocial motivations were entered as predictors of 
psychopathic traits did not influence the significance of antisocial motivations as a predictor. 
Thus, again, it does not appear that the antisocial motivation scores were synonymous with 
measures of perspective taking. 
The next step in the investigation of this measure’s validation was to explore what might 
explain when (or, more specifically, for whom) people are prosocially motivated or antisocially 
motivated. The results indicated that the target of one’s empathic concern was important to 
describing the nature of the motivation for that concern. People did report prosocial and 
antisocial motivations, but this frequently depended who the target was (either ingroup, neutral 
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group, or outgroup). The significant interaction between Target Type and Motivation Type 
showed that significantly higher prosocial motivations were reported for ingroup and netural 
group targets, compared to antisocial motivations. For outgroup targets, this pattern was 
reversed. Participants reported significantly more antisocial motivations for this group. It thus 
appears that as affiliation with targets becomes less, the chance that antisocial motivations will 
exceed prosocial motivations increases. The Target Types additionally elicited significant 
differences in ratio scores, further describing the interaction between Target Type and 
Motivation Type. The magnitude of the difference between prosocial motivations and antisocial 
motivations diminished from ingroup to neutral group to outgroup. This indicates a particular 
preference or bias for prosocial motivations towards the ingroup. In sum, the results point to the 
importance of asking who the target of one’s empathic concern is when determining the 
prosociality/antisociality of motivations, and when determining the relationship between these 
motivation types. 
Phase 2 
Relationship with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). Empathic concern and 
perspective taking contribute uniquely to the prediction of prosocial motivations, with no 
significant interaction. The regression predicting prosocial to antisocial motivation ratios 
presented a similar story, where variance in the magnitude of difference between prosocial and 
antisocial motivations was being predicted by these subscales. Here, though, only empathic 
concern reached threshold for statistical significance, and perspective taking was only marginally 
significant. These results make it apparent that these subscales of the IRI – one of the most 
commonly used empathy measures – is not capturing the same elements of empathic concern as 
is captured by the ECMS. While empathic concern partially predicts prosocial motivations, and 
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the magnitude of difference between prosocial and antisocial motivations, it is likely in large part 
due to the prosocial conceptual framework within which the empathic concern subscale was 
created.  
Relationship with Psychopathy. This study has demonstrated a motivation for empathic 
concern among those with psychopathic traits. Exploring the relationship between empathic 
motivations and psychopathy can serve as an example for how considering the valence of 
people’s motivations more thoroughly explains their concern for the thoughts and feelings of 
others. In contrast to the extant literature, but in line with the hypotheses of the current studies, 
those with psychopathic traits actually exhibited higher motivation for empathic concern. This 
anomaly makes more theoretical sense when the prosociality and antisociality of motivations is 
considered, because they only scored significantly higher than the other participants on antisocial 
motivations. This result would have been perplexing and seemingly contradictory to the general 
understanding of psychopathy – how could psychopathic people not differ in their motivations 
for empathic concern? – had we not had a measure that considered antisocial motivations for 
concern.  
Interestingly, there was not a significant zero-order correlation between psychopathic 
traits and prosocial motivations to empathize. I had expected a negative correlation between 
these two variables because of the inherent antisociality of psychopathic populations. The lack of 
correlation between psychopathic traits and prosocial motivations to empathize is, however, in 
line with the finding that antisocial and prosocial motivations themselves were not correlated. 
This result indicates that the increased antisociality of those with psychopathic traits does not 
necessitate reduced prosociality – at least insofar as the motivations measured in the ECMS. 
Overall, the relationships between prosocial motivations, antisocial motivations, and 
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psychopathic traits could support a different approach to investigating empathic concern and 
psychopathy. Rather than focusing on characterizing their empathic concern deficiency, perhaps 
it would be most informative to characterize the antisociality versus prosociality of their 
motivations for empathic concern. 
General Discussion 
This study directly measured what people report as motivations for empathic concern. 
Preliminary evidence for the presence of prosocial and antisocial motivations for empathic 
concern, and evidence to support the importance of considering the target of one’s concern, were 
presented. Before now, research had not viewed empathic concern from the perspective of 
potential antisociality, though some research had begun to quantify similar constructs from this 
same lens. For example, Salovey and Mayer (1990) proposed that emotional skills could be used 
antisocially, such as for manipulation or to sociopathically lead others to unfortunate ends. More 
specifically, De Raad (2005) lamented that emotional intelligence (of which empathy is a central 
component) as manipulative or antisocial is a highly neglected area of study. Limited work in the 
field of emotional intelligence has made similar propositions. Austin and colleagues (2006), for 
instance, suggested that emotional intelligence is placed under the umbrella of positive 
psychology because of the bountiful evidence to support its role in increased happiness, life 
satisfaction, psychological health, and social network size and quality, as well as reduced stress, 
depression, and loneliness. However, it has also been suggested that the value or outcome of 
emotional intelligence greatly depends on the prosocial or antisocial moral end which it serves 
(Carr, 2000). It is hard to distinguish emotional intelligence from emotional cleverness or 
cunning (Carr, 2000), particularly when there are instances when one may be antisocially 
motivated to concern himself with the thoughts or feelings of another person. The findings from 
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the Phase 1 contributed to this growing body of work that has stated to analyze the antisocial side 
of the social skills coin.  
Removing ourselves from the unfounded assumption that empathy is prosocial is 
arguably the step back that the field has been calling for with the conceptualization of empathy. 
For example, Vachon and Lynam (2016) suggested that the reason why empathy and aggression 
are “virtually unrelated” is because “current conceptualizations of empathy are too narrow and 
fail to capture the full range of the construct.” This is addressed by the current line of work 
through simply asking people what motivates them to be concerned with the thoughts and 
feelings of others. If results had suggested that individuals were only, as some might have 
predicted, prosocially motivated to empathize, then a consideration of antisocial motivations 
would not have improved our ability to capture the full range of the empathy construct. 
Importantly, though, people report a combination of both types of motivation. This 
reconsideration of the construct might help to explain some inconsistencies in the field, and it 
begins to address the long lamented confusion regarding the conceptualization of empathy. 
It is of note that the current work should differentially influence the constructs of 
empathic concern specifically, and empathy as a whole. The influence of the current work speaks 
most directly to the construct of empathic concern. This component of empathy has nearly 
always been presented through a positive, prosocial frame of view, but the current findings 
suggest that the construct may require reconsideration. While still largely so, the broader concept 
of empathy has not been as constrained to a prosocial light as the empathic concern component, 
perhaps due in part to the perspective taking component that has not been limited to a prosocial 
or antisocial lens. Nonetheless, the construct as a whole retains its prosocial lilt because of the 
restricted view of the empathic concern component. Widening the breadth of the empathic 
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concern component should therefore have a similar effect on the empathy construct as a whole as 
it does on the empathic concern component specifically, which is to allow for the consideration 
of more than just prosocial motivations. The current work therefore has specific implications to 
modify the field’s current approach to empathic concern, and consequently may broaden the way 
we view the empathy construct as a whole.  
Limitations & Future Directions 
A limitation of both Phase 1 and Phase 2 is with regards to generalizability. The sample 
was collected from university students who were enrolled in a psychology class, which limits our 
ability to make claims about the general population. The results would benefit from a larger 
clinical sample, or at least a more diverse community sample. Another limitation of the study 
was sample size. While large enough to have the power for many statistical tests, the sample size 
was inadequate for Phase 1’s factor analyses due to the high number of items entered (40 items). 
Following the general rule of 10 participants per item, we should have had a minimum of 400 
participants to reliably conduct this test. The results of the current study should therefore be 
interpreted as preliminary evidence, to be followed up by replication with a larger and more 
generalizable sample. Replications could also consider a broader sample pool, to include a more 
general sample than only university students. 
This study was only preliminary with regards to other factors as well. Phase 2 aimed to 
situate the Empathic Concern Motivations Scale among other relevant measures of empathy and 
personality, but only two measures were collected for this purpose. Considering at least the 
multitude of available empathic concern measures, conclusions should be drawn cautiously until 
further investigation explores the relationship of the scale with other established measures. 
Furthermore, Phase 2 concluded that the IRI was not adept at capturing the motivations of 
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empathic concern, but it may be the case that other, less commonly used measures of empathy 
and empathic concern are able to capture this motivation. Future work and replications of the 
study may wish to include a wider range of empathy and personality measures to most fully 
describe this new scale.  
Next, Target Type was one way that this study considered external factors that contribute 
to empathic concern. Criticism of the current work’s ingroup, neutral group, and outgroup labels 
may arise as a result of the loose use of this social psychological terminology. There was not a 
specific classification system used to categorize targets into each of these groups, such as race 
(Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014), gender (Halim et al., 2017), or random ingroup assignment 
(Otten, 2016), as there often is in intergroup research. Rather, targets were placed under each 
label according to the extent to which they would have features typical to that group. There are 
various features that could result in a target being classified as ingroup targets, rather than just 
one. For example, “ingroup-like” features might include greater similarity (Batson, Lishner, 
Cook, & Sawyer, 2005), closeness (Dorrough et al., 2015), familiarity (Zebrowitz et al., 2008), 
likability, or a sense of “we-ness” (Dovidio, 2000). The ingroup targets were also assigned to 
that label if they possessed particular favourable qualities, while the outgroup targets frequently 
possessed unfavourable qualities. Neutral targets could possess both or neither favourable or 
unfavourable qualities. Future iterations of the scale may consider different labels for the Target 
Types, perhaps “liked” versus “disliked” targets. The present study, however, did not measure 
likeability specifically, and closeness was not the entire basis upon which the intergroup 
differences were based. Therefore, this study should not seek to label the Target Types by 
closeness or likeability, and retains a more general interpretation of social psychological ingroup 
and outgroup labels.   
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The ECMS’s measure of closeness was notably vague, as participants were simply asked 
how close they were to each target. This measure should be explored more precisely in next 
iterations of the scale. While it was an important factor in the study’s current results, its precise 
meaning and interpretation may have been left too much in the hands of participants. The 
literature does identify different types of closeness – based on features such as similarity, 
biological relatedness, or emotions – that indicate differences even between different types of 
ingroups (i.e. family versus relatives versus friends; Uleman et al., 2000). Use of a general, 
undefined closeness measure, such as the one used in the current study, has been associated most 
strongly with the emotional closeness type (Uleman et al., 2000), and so it is most likely that 
participants interpreted the general closeness question in that manner. Nonetheless, this 
hypothesis should be tested using more specific and direct closeness questions as the ECMS 
continues to develop. This will allow for a more precise interpretation of participants’ responses 
regarding closeness.  
Beyond Target type and Closeness, further research should explore other factors that are 
known associates of empathic concern to determine how they might contribute to the nature of 
people’s motivations to empathize. For example, Batson and colleagues (2007) investigated how 
valuing the welfare of someone in need played a significant antecedent role in empathic concern. 
It is possible that this, and other situational attributions, impact motivations for empathic concern 
beyond the consideration of the target’s ingroup or outgroup classification.  
It is also interesting to consider the results of the current research within the context of 
other motivation classification schemes (i.e. other than prosocial versus antisocial). For instance, 
motivations can be classified as approach motives or avoidance motives, driving people to 
engage in more or less of a behaviour. Weisz & Zaki (2018) define empathic motives as goal-
BEYOND PROSOCIAL MOTIVATIONS TO EMPATHIZE   57 
 
directed, internal forces that drive people toward or away from empathy. Avoidance motives 
occur if the engagement in empathy will lead to costly helping, if it will be exhausting, or if it 
interferes with a personal (Weisz & Zaki, 2018). With a specific focus on approach motivations, 
the present line of research proposes a broader consideration of what might constitute an 
approach motivation for empathy. Future research may wish to investigate prosocial versus 
antisocial avoidance motivations as an extension of the current work. Additionally, it may be a 
worthy venture to explore motivations for empathic concern beyond just prosocial and antisocial. 
There are conceivably instances where people are not antisocially motivated, per se, but are 
motivated by a particular selfish interest to concern themselves with another person’s thoughts or 
feelings. In a game of Poker, for example, it is in one’s own best interest - and not the best 
interest of the target – to concern oneself with the thoughts and feelings of an opponent. This is 
arguably a self-interested motivation, rather than necessarily an antisocial one. 
Finally, how motivations to empathize translate to behaviour may be the most important 
directions for further research of this area. Since motivations or intentions are not always 
indicative or predictive of future behaviour (Bagozzi, 1992), we should look into how well 
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APPENDIX 1 – Empathic Concern Motivation Scale 
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APPENDIX 2: Target Factor Analysis – Factor Loadings 
 
Title. 
 Prosocial Motivations Antisocial Motivations 
Target Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Mother .065 .082 .701 .844 .093 .118 
Father .188 .071 .595 .840 .161 .041 
Sibling .200 -.040 .604 .807 .281 -.021 
Best Friend .211 .071 .700 .829 .240 -.006 
Distant 
Friend 
.175 .002 .665 .743 .364 .001 
Grandparent .050 .099 .766 .692 -.003 .169 
Aunt .187 .046 .840 .782 .166 .250 
Uncle .188 .053 .856 .794 .246 .188 
Cousin .213 .083 .802 .812 .249 .187 
Teacher .596 .021 .497 .656 .477 .130 




.591 .017 .500 .735 .499 .001 
Beggar on 
the street 
.650 .032 .235 .547 -.049 .451 
Doctor .787 .204 .268 .749 .211 .324 




.805 .295 .155 .635 .211 .428 




.776 .209 .213 .710 .276 .274 
Fellow 
Student 
.711 .184 .284 .724 .507 -.038 








.604 .508 .043 .470 .687 -.037 
Someone 
you dislike 
.611 .498 .124 .365 .702 -.035 
Someone 
you respect 
.528 .003 .165 .813 .004 .102 
Someone 
you hate 
.243 .828 .068 .210 .858 .050 
Someone 
who took 
.123 .735 .033 .120 .809 .052 





rude to your 
best friend 





.607 .307 .104 .372 .721 -.047 
Bully .332 .737 -.011 .161 .829 .257 




.077 .597 -.094 -.008 .662 .290 
Grumpy 
Customer 









.227 .737 .122 .274 .820 .142 
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Psychopath .387 .347 .141 .104 .637 .540 
A thief who 
stole to feed 
his family 
.469 .084 .189 .268 .295 .687 
Burglar .087 .731 .121 .099 .620 .661 
Rapist -.102 .695 .162 -.023 .605 .583 
Restaurant 
Server 
.889 .072 -.016 .637 .441 .315 
Oprah .704 -.104 .077 .412 .617 .051 
Donald 
Trump 
.613 .009 .072 .135 .794 .167 









.639 .124 .282 .460 .029 .539 
 
